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Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Attn: Mr. Chief, Contact Division, OO
Dr. Nikolai POPPE

25 September 1950

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1. The attached article on psychological warfare is a condensed paraphrasing of material submitted to this office by Dr. POPPE. We believe that it contains the salient features of his rather digressive writing and we believe that it may be of some interest to you.

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK

Enclosure (A) - Article entitled "Psychological Warfare"

R-0015.

To - KEF. []

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Psychological Warfare

The strength of the Communists, and especially the Soviet Communists, is their propaganda. At the same time, this is the greatest weakness of the non-Communist world. Two major factors, rendering the position of the Western World weak in this respect, are its abstract approach to world problems and its refusal to adapt this approach to changing conditions everywhere in the world.

This lack of realism on the part of the Western powers is shown by their reluctance up until the present to consider the rearmament of Western Germany. This reluctance was the outgrowth of distrust of Germany, not because of its position ~~in the world~~, but because of its past role as world trouble-maker. However, the Germany of yesterday no longer exists, nor do the elements within Germany who must bear the responsibility for German aggression in the past, namely the German landed aristocracy or Prussian Junkers, and the industrial cartels. Secondly, the agricultural and industrial backing for another war is lacking in Western Germany. It must be remembered that not only has Western Germany traditionally lacked sufficient agricultural products, but at the present time, its position is even more untenable, owing to the influx of millions of refugee peoples. From an industrial standpoint, Western Germany is lacking in oil. German oil wells could supply a potential Germany army with less than 10% of the amount of oil necessary to conduct a successful war.

Additionally, and probably the most important point to be considered, is the fact that the Western Germans are afraid of Communism. In order not to become the next victim of Soviet aggression, the Germans would prefer an alliance with the West. It is true that as recently as 1959 the Germans concluded an alliance with the USSR, and it is not improbable that they would do so again if conditions had remained unchanged. There is no question of static conditions, however, and Adenauer and the Western German politicians are no fools. They have only to look around them to see that an alliance with the USSR today, with the terrific disparity of strength existing between the two countries, would result in Germany's becoming no more than a satellite like the Eastern European nations.

Yet in the case of some 100,000 armed police in Eastern Germany, a veritable Soviet Wehrmacht, opposition to the rearmament of Western Germany has been based to a great extent on such obsolete considerations as those outlined above. It would seem that only recently has an attempt been made to assess the lack of realism of this view in the light of Germany's present material resources and psychological presuppositions.

Equally unrealistic is the Western Powers attitude toward past treaties with the USSR, at Yalta, Potsdam, etc., that is, their intense preoccupation with commitments made to the Soviets. For the Soviets have not only consistently violated these treaties, but in an article entitled "The Secret Mission", published in Pravda and Izvestia (August 1950), the USSR Government proclaimed that the Western allies had worked secretly with the Germans, betraying to the Nazis all Soviet secret information - thus have the Soviets renounced in effect any former alliance with the West at all.

As opposed to these unrealistic views, I would suggest the following points concerning the Soviet Union to be stressed by the Western Powers in their propaganda:

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- (a) World War II was possible only in consequence of the Stalin-Hilter pact.
- (b) The USSR not only supported the Nazis during the war with oil and grain, but also gave them military support in the form of submarine bases, partitioning of Poland, and delaying tactics in regard to the war in Japan, etc.

Another error consistently made by the Western nations is their confusion of Communism with nationalism, and their assessment that each is bad. Thus, while the Soviets employ nationalism very efficaciously for their own purposes, the West cowers before it in fear. We should not forget that nationalism does not necessarily have distasteful aspects; sound nationalism has nothing in common with racial persecutions and discrimination. Actually nationalism is a strong weapon in the struggle against Communism, but too often, when a revolt breaks out in a former colony, the European nations give it the label of Communism when it is no more than an expression of nationalism, to which some Communist elements may or may not adhere. That is why a resurgence of nationalism in Western Germany should not be regarded as a danger. Co-mingled with this nationalism is a feeling of superiority to the Russians which is completely justified and upon which the West could capitalize inasmuch as many of the scientific claims made today by the Russians were the results of German research. Take, for example, the famous Orientalists in Russia, all of whom were German: Pallas, Adelung, Schmidt, Beethlingk, Dorn, Fraehn, Uslar, Radloff, Balamann, Bartheld, Oldenburg, Rosenberg, etc. What I am advocating is a directed nationalism which will employ native customs, science, etc. to stimulate pride among native peoples, and at the same time stress the fact that only in a free, democratic society can such forms of self expression exist. In connection with this, the West could employ a device used with great success by the Soviets, that is, the publishing of texts in native languages in which there is still too little literature. These texts, whether dealing with history, geography, the arts or other subjects, should foment a healthy nationalism and should serve as vessels for the transmission of western democratic ideals in the same manner in which the Soviet Union employs texts for the preaching of their pseudo-scientific Marxist theories, pan-Slavism, or whatever.

Not only does the Western world have an unhealthy fear of nationalism as such, but it has an equally unhealthy fear regarding Soviet strength and impregnability. This fear has the following disastrous effects: a) it disarms the free world psychologically, so that they regard defeat at the hands of the Soviets inevitable if war breaks out; b) it encourages the Soviets and convinces them that a war would bring them victory. Therefore, the West must take action to combat these fears by building up strength superior to that of the USSR. This can be done in one way by building up the armed forces of Western Europe under the Atlantic Pact. The Atlantic Pact nations should have not less than 25 ready combat divisions in the near future and be able to mobilize not less than 50 divisions within a few weeks after the outbreak of war. Aside from these divisions, there should be a well-equipped US army to rush into combat without loss of time.

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Other measures should also be undertaken such as the creation of a West German army of not less than seven divisions, the inclusion of Spain in any plan for the rearmament of Europe to the extent of not less than 500,000 men, the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan and Japanese rearmament, and the integration of Turkey and Greece into the Atlantic pact. Thus an effective encirclement of the USSR and its satellites can be instituted, capitalizing on the fears of the Soviets regarding the carrying on of a war on more than one front. A huge land army of anti-Communist forces would have the best possible psychological effect on both the USSR and its satellites and upon those countries which are presently following a fence-sitting policy in regard to the bestowal of their allegiance. Although this fear complex on the part of the West can be cured only by deeds, that is by increasing its military strength, the accompaniment to such deeds should be an incessant flow of propaganda to the peoples of the world telling them how much stronger the non-Communist world is than the USSR and its satellites.

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